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8. German Idealism in a Comparative
Perspective: Hierarchy in the
Thought of Fichte
Louis Dumont

From the time we first met in 1971, Benjamin Nelson greatly
encouraged my comparative efforts. As a modest tribute to his memory,
here is an extract from a work in progress dealing with social philosophy
in Germany between 1770 and 1830.
The enterprise is comparative in two senses, or rather on two levels.
First it draws its basic categories from a previous study of Indian society
and culture, that belonged technically to social anthropology, and second
it focuses on the different forms that the modern system of ideas and
values has actually taken in different countries, the national variants, as I
call them, of modern ideology. In the former work, the comparative
aspect implicit in social anthropology has been made explicit and has
resulted in two pairs of oppositions bearing on values: hierarchy
v. equality on the one hand, and on the other holism v. individualism, or
the paramount valuation either of the social whole or of the human
individual. In the present case those two distinctions are brought to bear
on the interpretation of German social ideology as compared to its
French counterpart.
To allow for some development, an earlier paper has been split into
two: while elsewhere I deal with the Franco-German contrast in relation
to the conception of the nation, here I shall concentrate on some aspects
of Fichte's thought.'
The social and political philosophy of Fichte still poses a problem
today. Fichte explicitly set out to be the philosopher of the French
Revolution. And yet he has often been considered in Germany, notably
by the historian Meinecke writing before the first world war, as a
precursor of pangermanism or of the theory which binds the state to the
collective will-to-power of a people. On the other hand, the French
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philosopher, who has given a painstaking exegesis of Fichte's system,
Martial Gueroult, has been deeply concerned with showing that Fichte
throughout his life and writings remained perfectly faithful to the
Revolution and that whatever else is found in Fichte on that level is quite
secondary, whether it be his deeply German manner of thinking and
feeling or his" German messianism," not to speak of the misunderstandings
and falsifications or misrepresentations he has been made to suffer
under. 2 In the face of such conflicting opinions, I should like to show that
we can better account for the social philosophy of Fichte and for its
subsequent destinies by starting from the difference between the two
sub-cultures, German and French. I shall mainly endeavour to show the
presence in Fichte, decidedly equalitarian though he is, of a hierarchical
form of thought the equivalent of which it would be difficult to detect
among the French revolutionaries.
Let us go straight to the heart of the difficulty, the Addresses to the
German Nation-those lectures delivered by Fichte after the Prussian
defeat at lena in Berlin then occupied by Napoleon's troops. From the
divergent interpretations and contradictory valuations of our two witnesses
we can extract a minimum of agreement. For Gueroult, Fichte remains
true to the revolutionary ideal, while according to Meinecke Fichte goes
one step forward-but only one step-towards the truly German, more
or less pangermanist, conception of the state. We observe that both are
actually agreed on one point: that there is a universalist component in
Fichte's thought (which Gueroult praises while Meinecke deplores it).
Let us take this common admission as our point of departure. We shall
even admit with Gueroult that this universalism is the essential or
encompassing component in the Addresses and in Fichte's social thought
in general. Yet it does not account by itself for the exaltation of the
German nation, which is the more striking as the latter was in factunlike Prussia-absolutely non existent in those days. We are thus bound
to search for another element that combines with Fichte's universalism to
produce his nationalism.
There are two lineages in German thought. As against the Herderian,
or one might say historicist or monadic lineage, which has as its basic
tenet the specificity and irreplaceability of each culture or people, Fichte
belongs with Kant and even with Hegel to the universalist lineage.
Meinecke can reproach him for extolling in the last analysis not the
concrete nation as a particular corporate will-to-live, but the "nation de
raison," the nation as a rational universal entity. Of course it is true that
the universalist or cosmopolitic ideology does not bar patriotism, the
French levee en masse in 1793 seems to bear witness to the fact, and it is
easily understood: if I conceive of myself as an Individual, a representative
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of the human species, I nevertheless live in fact in a given society or
nation, and I spontaneously look at this more restricted circle as the
empirical form that the human species takes for me, so that I may feel an
attachment for it without justifying my feeling explicitly through what
differentiates my nation from others. Yet this is not enough in Fichte's
case. His stance is something like "the German spirit is characterized by
universality," on the face of it a quite ambiguous statement.
The devoted French biographer of Fichte, Xavier Leon, has shown that,
in the Addresses and other texts of the same period, Fichte put forth theses
bearing a certain likeness to those of Romantics like August Wilhelm
Schlegel and Schelling. On the present issue, Fichte admits with Schlegel
that the German people is destined to dominate the world, but he
thoroughly modifies the meaning of the assertion by basing it on the
identity of universality and germanity, a trait which was, by the way,
already present in his slightly anterior Patriotic Dialogues. 3 It is all
essentially a matter of humanity and its development. The ambiguity lies
in the fact that, when Fichte insists on the regenerative function of the
German people, and on the resulting attribution of precedence to
Germany, we do not know whether he is unilaterally applying universalism
to a particular population, as by a sort of hypertrophied patriotism, or
whether he is asserting the hegemony of a will-to-live that uses
universalism merely as a prop. Actually, if we want to remain close to
Fichte's thought, we must maintain that for him the two aspects do not
exclude each other as they do for his interpreters, but coincide. This
coincidence is the fact that, strange as it looks, we must try to understand.
As already stated, Fichte is on the whole a stranger to the Herderian
and romantic notion of the diverse characters of cultures or peoples as so
many facets of the richness of the universal Whole. When he does use this
notion in a passage of the thirteenth address, it is part of a clever
argument directed precisely against the romantic dream of a new
Christian-Germanic Empire. More generally, it is true that Fichte adopts
in that period the current stereotypes of the excellence of the German
character, of the German language, etc. ... , but he does so essentially in
order to state a hierarchy among peoples in the name of the very values of
universalism. Now I contend that, apart from any borrowing from the
Romantics, it is possible to show the presence in Fichte's thought in
general, alongside of a strong individualistic-cum-universalistic stress, of
a holistic aspect and more especially of a hierarchical component. I shall
leave out here the holistic tendency, very strong in the authoritarian
socialism of the Closed Commercial State, and which could be found also in
passages of other texts-uneasily cohabiting with individualistic features,
but this is after all an ubiquitous trait in modern thought, including
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sociological thought.4 What is more noteworthy is the emergence, all
along the works of Fichte, and in clear contrast with the Enlightenment
and French revolutionary thinking, of a hierarchical form of thought.
To demonstrate this presence of hierarchy in Fichte's thought, I must
first recall the definition of hierarchy to which the previous study
mentioned above has led me. S I shall briefly note a few fundamental
points: 1) Hierarchy has in principle nothing to do with political power
although it is often found inextricably enmeshed in it. 2) Nor does
hierarchy require a linear succession of terms or entities, although it can
generate such chains. 3) It is most economically seen as a relation
between two entities in which the one is super-, the other subordinated.
The relation of the two entities to a whole being explicitly or implicitly
present, the most immediate case is when the first entity constitutes the
whole in question while the second is an element of it (system and
subsystem). 4) The hierarchical relation is best analysed into two
statements bearing on two ranked levels: on the superior level the two
ranked entities are identical, or consubstantial, on the inferior level they
are opposed as contrary, complementary or contradictory. Therefore I
speak of the hierarchical relation as the encompassing of the contrary. Thus
in the creation of man and woman in the first Book of Genesis, Eve is
fashioned from a rib of Adam to signify that woman is encompassed in
man, man being: a) on the first level the representative of the human
species as a whole; b) on the second level the opposite of woman. Apart
from the linguistic fact of man (or Adam) figuring on the two levels, the
essential feature is that the couple as as whole hierarchizes its components, or
in other words unites them while recognizing their difference.
Fichte is fiercely equalitarian on the political level, in contrast with Kant
and with most of the Germans-but in agreement with Herder (and
Rousseau)-and in perfect consonance with the French Revolution in its
Jacobin development. Is it not therefore surprising to find an example of
formalized hierarchy in the very book that the young Fichte devotes in
1793 to the defense of the Revolution, the Contributions to the rectification of
the judgement of the public? A single diagram is found in the book. It is
intended to show the State as subordinated to the individual. It shows
four concentric circles of which the largest includes-or in my language
encompasses-the second, and so on: the" domain of consciousness,"
i.e., individualism in its moral form, embraces the domain of natural law,
the latter in turn that of contracts in general, and this last that of civil
contract or of the State. Here is, repeated thrice, precisely the encompassing
disposition through which I have defined hierarchy.6 It is remarkable that
this argument is found in a vindication of the French Revolution against
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the attacks of Burke and Rehberg. Of course there is no conflict at all
between this schema and Fichte's purpose, for it deals with pure
hierarchy, which has nothing to do with (political) power. Yet, it is
paradoxical that a staunch equalitarian should resort to a form of pure
hierarchical thought. I bet that one would be hard put to find anything
similar in contemporary revolutionary France. Already at such an early
date, Fichte presents, alongside of the equalitarian conviction through
which he is in communion with the Revolution, a quite different form of
thought.
There is an element of social hierarchy in a passage of the Closed
Commercial State where the needs of the several social categories are
carefully distinguished. The scholar or scientist, in the interest of what we
could call the output of his work, needs rich foods and a refined
environment while, at the other end of the social scale, the peasant is able
to assimilate coarse meals, which are sufficient for him. The trait is
interesting in contrast to the stress on the equalitarian principle in the
book at large, and still more so in contrast to the French developments in
the direction of a state regulated economy, to which Fichte's model is
parallel. 7
The examples of hierarchy I just referred to are yet details, local, almost
anecdotic occurrences. Far more weighty, decisive indeed in my view, is
the presence of the hierarchical opposition at the very heart of Fichte's
system of philosophy, in that dialectic of the "I" (or self) and the "Not-I"
(not-self) which constitutes the foundation of his Wissenschaftslehre
(1794), the "transcendental dialectic," as Philonenko calls it, that establishes
the conditions of all knowledge. The demonstration lies at hand, for it is
the ''I'' that posits the "not-I." As in the case of Adam and Eve, there are
two levels in the relationship: on the first level, the I or self is
undifferentiated, it is the absolute I or self; on the second level, the self
posits within itself the not-self, and ipso-facto posits itself as against the
not-self, so that we have, facing each other, the self and the not-self. The
not-self is on the one hand contained within the self, on the other hand it
is the opposite of self. This strictly hierarchical disposition of the Fichtean
dialectic is noteworthy from many angles, especially perhaps with regard
to Kant and to Hegel. On the one hand it is the hierarchical disposition
that allows Fichte to integrate into a whole Kant's two Reasons, pure
Reason and practical Reason. On the other hand, Hegel's dialectic will be
no more hierarchical.
The fact takes some wonder and is worth pondering, for the young
Hegel was intent on totality and had finally reached a hierarchical
definition of it when he wrote, in his last fragment in Frankfort, that Life
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was "the union of union and nonunion" (Verbindung und Nichtverbindung). 8
Here is, if anywhere, that" encompassing of the contrary" through which
I proposed to define hierarchy.
This formula of the young Hegel is no obiter dictum. It is central to what
has been called by the Editor the "Fragment of a system," a text that, even
grievously incomplete as we have it, marks the conclusion of the whole
period of the "early theological writings" and is roughly contemporary
with Hegel's resolve to join Schelling in lena and enter the career of
philosophy proper. The importance of the formula is confirmed from the
fact that we can follow it up in subsequent writings. In lena it is identity
that must be conceived as "the identity of identity and non-identity," and
in the Logic we find the infinite as the union of the infinite and the finite. 9
Yet there is no gainsaying the fact that this unmistakable hierarchical
aspect is eliminated from Hegel's definitive thought. What has happened?
It is certainly not the case that Hegel has turned his back to the motto in
which he had condensed the yearnings of his youth. Rather a gradual
transformation took place, that is signalled, in lena and later on, by
changes in vocabulary indicative of conceptual modifications and shifts.
The totality that was called Life in the "Fragment" became the Absolute, and
then the absolute Spirit, that is to say the Absolute as subject. All this is
well known, but, as the hierarchical perception itself, so its fate has not
hitherto attracted notice. to
What became of it can most graphically and economically be seen from
the section of the Logic that deals with the dialectic of the infinite and the
finite, to which a recent exegete attributes a central place and exemplary
value. 11 In this long and toilsome discussion, a real Auseinandersetzung,
Hegel asserts not only, as hinted at above, that the infinite contains the
finite, but also conversely that the finite contains the infinite. The reader
who admits that the latter statement is obviously not true in the same sense
as the former, who bears in mind our remarks, and who immerses himself
in the intricacies of the development will I think conclude as I do that
Hegel here labours very hard to eliminate the dissymmetry inherent in
the relationship and give equal status to its two poles. Infinity, which
attached, to begin with, to the encompassing of the contrary, will in the
end have been transferred to the process of transition from one pole to the
other, and to negativity as the motive force or principle of this process. t2
All in all, infinity has transited-whether wholly or only partly-from the
domain of wholeness or transcendance to that of immanence and
dialectics. It seems that Hegel's effort, or a considerable part of it, was
precisely directed at the elimination of the hierarchical aspect, and
judging from this particular form of it, his dialectic is likely to owe to this
intention a good deal of its complexity.
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Of course this is not to say that hierarchical aspects cannot be detected
in Hegel's system as a whole, and especially in the architectonics of it. It
reappears explicitly, or almost so, at the supreme level, that of Absolute
Spirit, 13 and implicitly, almost shamefacedly, at less exalted levels, at any
rate in the social philosophy (Objective Spirit), for it is clear that Hegel's
State, as holistic, encompasses in our sense of the term civil society and its
individualism. We cannot here enlarge on those aspects and must be
content with stating that hierarchy, although implicitly present at the
start, has been somewhat forcibly expelled from the core of Hegel's
philosophy-an event of tremendous impact if one thinks of his
posterity. Everything looks as if Hegel had sensed in his own thinking the
incongruity that we detected in Fichte's Contributions, and eliminated it.
With Hegel the equalitarian value has grown more ambitious and
exclusive. So to speak, the acculturation to the French Revolution has
gone one wide step deeper. To highlight this point was the intention of
this brief Hegelian excursus.
Let us return to Fichte. We saw that, from the Contributions of 1793 to
the Addresses of 1807-8, including the transcendental fulcrum of the
Wissenschaftslehre, a hierarchical component is found in Fichte. We are
now in a position to answer the question we asked about the Addresses at
the beginning: what, aside from any occasional borrowing from the
Romantics, Fichte has added to the universalistic individualism of the
French Revolution is precisely this deep hierarchical perception. It takes
no wonder that for Fichte one particular people, opposed to other
peoples as the self is opposed to the not-self, embodies humanity at a
particular time. It embodies, that is, the human self as a whole. This is how
Fichte may at this point join the predominant current of German thought,
and the Romantics in particular.
At this point, it is apposite that we should try and see more precisely
the relation between Fichte's thought and the German ideological
pattern in general. There is a powerful holistic trend in German ideology
at large, and in conjunction with it we may I think admit that, as is
commonly held by foreigners and not by them alone, the German people
as a whole were, in our period and beyond it, strongly inclined to obey
the powers that be. Admittedly, this is a stereotype, but for the present
purpose we shall take the statement as true in comparison with other
west European peoples and the French in particular. In agreement with
this general background, German intellectuals in their great majority
admitted the necessity of subordination in society. Thus, according to
Kant, man is an animal that, in society, needs a master. Now what is true
within the society is true, mutatis mutandis, outside it, and given a plurality
of nations it was only natural, from such a point of view, to believe that
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some of them should dominate the others. Combined with the
ethnocentrism or sociocentrism which is found universally-the valuation
of "we" as against" others," the strangers-we have here the social basis
of what has been called "pangermanism."
In this environment, there were few champions of equalitarianism
among thinkers of influence, but they were determined. Herder and
Fichte, both of lowly origin and dependent on the affluent in their youth,
hated the domination of man over man. It is remarkable that they were
nevertheless able to think in hierarchical terms, for it means that they
spontaneously disentangled hierarchy-essentially a matter of valuesfrom political (and economic) power. The two things are most generally
confused, as we know only too well. On this point the contrast with
Rousseau, whose insertion in society was very similar but whose social
milieu was different, seems decisive. Thus, the fact that the thought of the
staunchly equalitarian Fichte was as essentially hierarchical as we have
shown is an index of the strength of the holistic component in German
culture.
We can now see clearly how insufficient it is to consider him either as a
faithful follower of the French Revolution who would have been only
secondarily endowed with German characteristics, or as a precursor of
pangermanism unable to rid himself completely of the abstract universalism
of the French. If one may extend the use of the word "translation" from
the linguistic to the cultural domain, then one will say that Fichte has
translated the French Revolution into German. A convinced equalitarian,
he did not admit of subordination in society as grounded in the nature of
man, and at the same time he kept alive a strong sense of hierarchy,
indeed he was able to give hierarchy a philosophical form, albeit
indirectly. Moreover, as Herder before him, he applied modern
individualism on the collective level, making of the people or nation an
individual of a superior order, and again as Herder, he saw humanity as
embodying itself in modern times in the Germanic culture-people, or the
German nation. 14
Perhaps a little more can be said in this place about hierarchy and
German ideology. If there is some truth in the stereotype that represents
the German people, in contrast for instance to the French in the same
period, as having a propensity to obey, if it is true that in German thought,
again in contrast to others, the necessity of subordination in society is
more often admitted then denied, then we would expect some of the
great German philosophers who have dealt at least occasionally with the
problems of society to have searched for the values that might justify
subordination, and, just as I have been led to do by the exemplary Indian
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case, to have isolated explicitly hierarchy as distinct from, if combined
with, power. This is not the case. At any rate the whole of German idealist
social philosophy can be, and has often been, surveyed without mentioning
at all hierarchy proper. How can this fact be understood? A first answer is
obvious: as we have seen from what happened with Hegel, those
philosophers have worked under the spell of the Reformation and, more
immediately, of the French Revolution, and they were more oriented
towards the powerful contemporary individualist and equalitarian trend
than towards the plain elucidation of their own social make-up.
But after all our question is wrongly put, witness the hitherto
unsuspected but glaring presence of the hierarchical form of thought at
the core of Fichte's philosophizing. True, Fichte does not directly name
what I called the hierarchical opposition, but he does spontaneously set it
to work, and thus he virtually uses the distinction between hierarchy and
power. Only the point is not acknowledged, not "thematized." And we
can well fancy why it is not. Fichte's equalitarianism was limited to the
refusal of subordination in society; it did not prevent him-perhaps it did
not yet prevent him-to hierarchize ideas, but for this to be possible the
two domains had to remain separate. In other words, Fichte could not
possibly recognize the encompassing form of thought as hierarchy, that is
as something that, although distinct in principle, is nevertheless present
in combination-lawfully even if not factually-in social subordination.
Fichte's achievement is remarkable, if one compares it with the young
Hegel's confounding under the category of "domination" (Herrschen)
despotic power, the transcendence of God among the ancient Jews and
that of the Kantian imperative. 15 It may be that Fichte had reached the
limit which no human mind could transcend under the circumstances,
that is, at a time when an all-powerful equalitarian ideal inspired minds of
his sort.
Here is perhaps a fateful turn of history. For let us allow ourselves a
wishful reconstruction: let us suppose that Fichte or another thinker had
crossed the limit and clearly distinguished hierarchy from power, and
that this acquisition had, in time, slowly permeated common German
consciousness. Then the German people, predisposed as it was to accept
subordination, would have learnt to distinguish between factual power
and its legitimacy with reference to values, and the Germans could have
avoided plunging into the outrageous and apocalyptic masquarade that
we have lived through and that has left its scar on them as well as on us.
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NOTES

1. The complementary paper, referred to hereafter as "Aspects," is "Aspects of
Interaction Between Cultures: Herder's Volk and Fichte's Nation," in Joseph B. Maier and
Chaim I. Waxman, eds., Ethnicity, Identity and History: Essays in Memory of Werner ]. Cahnman
(Transaction Books, 1982). The earlier paper was read at the 8th Annual Meeting of the
International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, Northbridge, California, March,
1979. The original version, unpublished in French, "The Social Philosophy of German
Idealism," has appeared in English translation, not seen by the author: "Communications
Between Cultures," in, Discoveries, Third International Symposium, Paris, October, 1978, ed. by
Bruce M. Adkins (Tokoya: Honda Foundation, 1979), pp. 87-113. A French summary has
appeared in Libre 6:233-250.
2. Martial Gueroult, Etudes sur Fichte (Paris, 1974), pp. 142-246, originally in Revue
philosophique, 64e annee, vol. 128 (1939), pp. 226-320. Friedrich Meinecke, Weltbiirgertum
und Nationalstaat, 3tte Ausgabe, (Miinchen, 1915), pp. 96-125.
5. Xavier Leon, Fichte et son temps, 2 books in 3 vol. (Paris, ed. 1954-9), II-I, pp. 433-63;
II-2, pp. 34-93.
4. Cf. for the Durkheimians my Homo Hierarchicus, note 3a; also "The anthropological
community and the ideology," Social Science Information, 18-6 (1979). Closer to our topic,
Karl Pribram, in a seminal paper published in 1922 and that has a prophetic ring, has called
"pseudo-universalism" (pseudo-holism) the underlying ideological formula that he
showed to be common to Prussian nationalism and to Marxian socialism: "Deutscher
Nationalismus und deutscher Sozialismus," Archiv fur SozialwissenschaJt WId S()zialpolitik, 49
(1922) :298-376.
5. The following is taken verbatim from "Aspects." Cf. Homo Hierarchicus (colI. Tell,
1979), pp. 396-403 and from "The Anthropological Community and the Ideology."
6. J. G. Fichte, Sdmmtliche Werke, 1845, Vol. VI, pp. 39-288; the figure is on page 133. The
reader might think that Fichte's circles, or some of them, indicate only subdivisions and do
not imply contrariety. He is referred to Fichte's commentary.
7. Xavier Leon, in, Fichte et son Temps, II, pp. 101-104, makes a parallel with Babeuf.
8. G. W. F. Hegel, Early Theological Writings, tT. by W. M. Knox (Chicago, 1948), p. 312,
from Hege/s theologisehe Jugendschriften (Tiibingen: von H. Noh!, 1907), p. 348.
9. The first two formulas are brought together in Jacques Taminiaux, La Nostalgie de la
Greee Ii l'aube de l'idealisme allemand (La Haye, 1967), p. 234. Among recent interpreters, only
Michael Theunissen and to a lesser extent Charles Taylor (see note 11 below) have, to my
knowledge, acknowledged clearly the hierarchical aspect of those formulas. Theunissen
mentions them repeatedly, indeed their common matrix is central to his general argument,
in Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970),
pp. 8, 15-16, 35, 47-9, 50, 55-6, 68, 72, 126-7, 161-3, etc.
10. Even with Theunissen, the "encompassing of the contrary," if it surfaces here and
there, is not systematically isolated, and perhaps for this reason early formulas are brought
to bear indiscriminately on later texts where they may not always be rele,ant (as when
Hegel is corrected, pp. 126-7, or about the infinite, pp. 8, 49).
11. Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 240-44,
esp. p. 242 init.
12. This movement seems to me somehow implied by Taylor, Hegel: first (p. 240), "the
Hegelian notion of infinity is of a whole which is not conditioned or bounded by something
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else," then (p. 242), "of a whole whose inner articulation and process unfolds of necessity,"
and finally (p. 244), of "the life inherent in the coming to be and passing away of the finite."
13. Theunissen, Hegel Lehre.
14. On Herder and on the conception of the nation, see Dumont, "Aspects."
15. Hegel, Early Theological Writings (Hegels Theologische Jugendschriften), passim Most
characteristic is the passage on pp. 265-66 (original) or p. 211 (English translation).
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